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OUR DUAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
What is the future form of our government in the United
States going to be? Will it become one centralized government
or will it continue to be a dual form of government?
It now seems generally agreed that the framers of our Con-
stitution established a dual form of government. Of course, at the
time, those who held the extreme states' rights position main-
tained that the Nation was a league of states, -while those who
held the extreme Federalist position maintained that the states
were mere administrative units of the federal government, but
the concensus of opinion today undoubtedly is that the Fathers
intended to establish a federation of nations.' This was one as-
pect of their scheme of checks and balances. They balanced the
nation against the states.
Any doubt vhich originally existed upon the subject was
resolved as a legal proposition by Chief Justice John Marshall
in favor of a dual form of government. He made the Union an
indestructible Union of indestructible states, a Commonwealth
of commonwealths. He took neither the extreme Federalist nor
the extreme states' rights position, but the position that our gov-
ernment was a federation of nations-a dual form of govern-
ment. He established the proposition that the Nation was sov-
ereign within its sphere, and the states were sovereign within
their spheres. His two celebrated opinions settling this question
were rendered in the eases of MeCutloug v. Maryland2 and Gib-
bons v. Ogden.3 It is true that in these cases he established thQ
supremacy of the United States over the states within the field
of its delegated powers and developed the doctrine of the implied
powers of the federal government, but he did not destroy the
supremacy of the states within their field of reserved powers nor
I U. S. Const. Art. 1, sections 8, 10; Tenth Amendment.
17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
S22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
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our dual form of government. He simply removed all doubt
as to whether the Constitution was a constitution or a compact.
Chief Justice Taney did not support the federal government
as broadly as John Marshall had. Yet he never departed from
Marshall's position that our government was a dual form of
government, and he rendered a number of opinions which vin-
idicated the supremacy of the national government within its
sphere.4
Thus stood the situation up to the time of the Civil War.
This entire period up to the Civil War was probably character-
ized by fear of the federal government. At first, in the time of
the making of the original Constitution it was fear of the federal
government by the states. Then, in the time of the -adoption of
the first ten amendments it was fear of the federal government
by the people as individuals. Yet, they overcame their fears suf-
ficiently to establish a federation rather than a league, and
though, under Marshall, at first the fears of many were accentu-
ated, yet gradally, except in the South so far as concerned the
slavery issue, these fears began to subside; and the Civil War
actually changed the fears of the people from fear of the federal
government to fear of the states.
With the Slavery Amendments and the first judicial inter-
pretations of them, in the Slaughterhouse Cases5 and Civil Rights
Cases,8 was ushered in a new epoch in United States constitu-
tional history. Since there were no longer fear and distrust of
the federal government, but instead fear and distruct of the
states, further limitations were by amendments placed upon the
states and the powers of the federal government were increased,
and United States citizenship was- made independent where be-
fore it had been derived from state citizenship. But the sover-
eignty of the states was not destroyed. Pressure also was brought
to bear upon the United States Supreme Court, especially by cor-
porate interests, to make it still further enlarge the sphere of
the federal government at the expense of the states by its con-
struction of the due processes clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
aEx Parte Wells, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 307, 15 L. Ed. 421, (1855);
Prague v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626, 10 L. Ed. 1060
(1841).
S83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 56, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18 (1883).
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rnent. But, at first, under the leadership of Justice Miller the
court steadfastly resisted this pressure and even intimated that
it doubted "very much whether any action of a state not di-
rected by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class,
or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the
purview of this provision." In this period, therefore, our dual
form of government still endured. The relative powers of the
nation and the states were changed somewhat, but the dual char-
acter of our government, as established by the founders and pre-
served by Marshall, still remained.
At last, however, under the leadership of Justice Field, a
reconstituted court yielded to the pressure of business interests
and extended the due process clause to the protection, not only
of all natural persons 7 and to matters of substantive law8 as well
as legal procedure8 but also of the property rights of corpora-
tions.0 By taking this action the Supreme Court established
the supremacy of the national government over the states in all
-matters concerning the property rights of corporations, the great
owners of property in our land. The use of federal injunctions
in labor disputes became a matter of course. Marshall, in the
great case of Cohens v. Virginia o had already practically made
the state courts inferior courts in the federal system, and had
extended the powers of the federal governments in his original
package decision,1" and in his development of the doctrine of the
7 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. Ed. 232, 4 Supp. Ct. Rep.
117 (1883); Chicago, Etc., By. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. Ed.
-976, 10 Sup. ,t. Rep. 1062 (1889); Reagan v. Farmers L. and T. Co., 154
U. S. 352, 38 L. Ed. 1040, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047 (1892); Allgeyer v.
Louisana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427 (1896);
Locihner v. New York,'198 U. S. 45, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539
(1904); Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 234, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep.
124 (1921); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 251 U. S. 344,
-66 L. Ed. 975, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57 (1921); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court,
Etc., of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 1003, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 630
(1922); Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 43
-Sup. Ct. Rep. 394 (1922); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 67 L. Ed.
1042, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625 (1922).
S Murray v. Hoboken L. and 1. Co., 59 U. S. (18 How.) 272, 15 L. Ed.
'372 (1855); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616 (187-7);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. Ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct., Rep. 399
(1892).
OMinneapolis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 126, 32 L. Ed. 595, 9
Sup. Ct. Rep. 207 (1888); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. Ed. 896,
14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108 (1892).
" 18 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821).
'Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 492, 6 L. Ed. 670 (1827).
KENTUCKY I&W JOUIMA
implied powers of the gederal government.1 2 The Supreme
Court, in this period of Justice Field, also made the powers of
the federal government under the interstate commerce clause
encroach upon those of the states until it is a question whether
or not the states have any jurisdiction over intrastate commerce
in a number of important lines of business ;13 and held that the
federal government has greater power against the states in both
taxation 14 and eminent domain' 5 than the states have in either
taxation' 6 or eminent domain' 7 against the federal government;
and stretched the scope of the postal powers,' 8 the treaty
powers19 and the war powers20 of the federal government until
it raises the suspicion that any act of the federal government
might be constitutional under them. As a result the dual char-
acter of our form of government underwent a profound change.
The dual form of government was not entirely destroyed, but
states' rights were radically affected and the states were in the
process of 'being reduced to the statuts of administrative units
of the federal government.
The process begun with Justice Field and his associates was
continued in the last period in our constitutional history, the
period of the recent amendments, with this difference that,
while the new growth in the Constitution accomplished by the
Supreme Court was by unauthorized judicial interpretation
and amendment, the new growth brought to pass by amendments
2McCu7lTough v. Maryland, supra, n. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, supra,
n. 3.
,Commission v, Railroad, 257 UI. S. 563, 66 L. Ed. 371, 42 Sup. CL
Rep. 232 (1921); Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed. 1341, 34 Sup-
Ct. Rep. 830 (1913); Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. Ed.
1511, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721 (1912).
' IVeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869); Sout-
Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. Ed. 461, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
110 (1905).
St. Louis v. W. U. TeL Co., 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. Ed. 148, 13 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 485 (1893); United States v. Gettysburg 'Electric Ry., 160 U. S.
668, 40 L. Ed. 576, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427 (1895).
"North Dakota v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 54 L. Ed. 307, 30 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 179 (1910); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 29 L. Ed.
845 (1886).
" Utah P. & L. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 61 L. Ed. 791, 37
Sup. Ct. Rep. 387 (1917).
'Pensacola Tel. Co. v. western U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. Ed.
708 (1877).
"Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep.
382 (1919).
"Miller v. U. S., 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 268, 20 L. Ed. 135 (1870).
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has been by the sovereign people themselves as contemplated by
the original Constitution; and while the earlier changes were
made because of fear of the states as such, the later amendments
have been made because of fear of individuals. These recent
amendments, especially the Eighteenth Amendment, have still
further tended to break down the dual character of our form of
government, until now it is little more than a shadow. It was
contended that the Eighteenth Amendment was unconstitutional
in that it was legislation rather than fundamental law, in that
it was not an amendment of any other provisions in the Consti-
tution but new matter introduced therein, and in that, if con-
stitutional, it made it possible to destroy the state sovereignties;
but the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
amendment in every respect.21  Hence it now seems to be con-
stitutional to destroy the fundamental characteristic of our dual
form of government either by judicial fiat or by constitutional
amendment. It is true that the legislatures of the states have
rejected, the Twentieth, or Child Labor, Amendment, and the
Supreme Court has declared two child labor laws 2 2 unconstitu-
tional on the ground that they were invasions of states' rights,
both of which indicate a revulsion against the constitutional
growth which has recently been taking place; but, while no one
can speak with assurance, the probabilities are that these occur-
rences are only temporary manifestations, and that sooner or
later there will set in again the trend in the direction of destroy-
ing our dual form of government until not a vestige of it
remains.
All of which raises the profound question of whether or not
a dual form of government is a desirable form of government.
Who were right, the founders of our government who gave it the
characteristic of two sovereignties, one within the other, or those
who more recently have been changing the form of our govern-
ment into a strong centralized government with the states mere
administrative units thereof ? It is an anomalous form of gov-
ernment. Is it without philosophical basis? Should the ten-
2N.ationaZ Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. Ed. 946, 40 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 486 (1919).
2Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529 (1918);
ChiZ$ Labor Tas Case, 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. Ed. 817, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449
(1921).
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dencies which have been prevailing for the past fifty years be-
encouraged, or should an effort be made to return our govern-
ment to its original foundation ?
The chief reasons for and. advantages of a dual form of gov-
ernment are the following:
(1) There is a sentimental reason. This was a strong
reason at the time of the making of our Constitution. The
states were firstj although, as Abraham Lincoln has shown, they
were dependent colonies, not sovereign states. The people of
each states had acquired a loyalty for and pride in their state.
They had not as yet any such pride and loyalty for the central
government. The Constitution would never have been adopted
had it provided for the destruction of the sovereignty of the
states. But this sentimental reason, once strong, is of little
force today. People have now acquired a pride and loyalty for
the national government. They have moved from one state to
another more and more. They have interests in many states.
Railways, automobiles, the telegraph, and the radio have further
tended to obliterate state lines. As a consequence no one, except
the politician, cares much whether he is governed by an admin-
istrative unit or by a sovereignty.
(2) The best reason for a dual form of government is prob-
ably the maintenance of local self-government and the prevention
of a bureaucracy. But in this respect our dual form of gov-
ernment has hopelessly failed. It has not prevented bureau-
cracy; and local self-government, especially in our cities (where
the city manager form of government has not been adopted)
has not proven a great success. So far as the prevention of a
monarchy is concerned, what is wanted is not a dual form of
government, but a separation of the powers of government. Per-
haps 'bureaucracy is inevitable. Local self-government is desir-
able, but it can be obtained in other ways than under a dual
form of government.
(3) Another reason for a dual form of government fre-
quently given is that it allows opportunity for experiments on a
small scale. The -advantages of such experimentation may be
somewhat questionable, but even if they are desirable it does not
follow that a dual form of government is necessary for them.
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Cities conduct such experiments, and yet they are not sovereign-
ties.
(4) Another argument for a dual form of government is
that it tends to prevent crises. It is impossible to say whether
or not this is true. All that we know is that we have had a
great many crises which a dual form of government has not pre-
vented, and countries without a dual form of government seem
to prevent crises as readily as we do.
(5) Another argument is that property and other indi-
vidual rights are better protected under a dual form of govern-
ment than they would be under a central government. The
first answer to this is that it is not true. Today the United
States Supreme Court is the great bulwark of property interests.
The second answer is that today in the United States property
does not need protection so much as people need protection
against property.
(6) The real present reason for a dual form of govern-
ment is the selfish one of escape from all government. The
principal advocates of a dual form of government today, among
those who think and did not merely inherit the idea, are the
natural and artificial persons who for some reason or other de-
sire to evade some law and who find a dual form of government a
convenient aid to their purposes. This is hardly a worthy arga-
ment.
(7) A final possible argument for a dual form of govern-
ment is that such form of government is the only way to protect
the states from liability for their wrongs and liabilities. The
answer to this argument is that they should not receive such pro-
tection. City, state, and national governments should be under
the same liability as individuals, and, though this is not yet
the law, there is promise that it may in time become the law and
already much progress has been made in this direction.28
The arguments against and disadvantages of a dual form
of government are:
(1) The lack of efficiency on the part of the states in the
enforcement of law and the administration of justice. States and
city governments are failing in the primary duty of protecting
2 See article upon this subject by Edwin M. Borchard, Yale Law
Review, 1924-25.
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the life and property of their citizens, who as a consequence are
going back to mercenaries. Express companies are employing
their own guards, and banks are relying upon their own force.
The difference in efficiency in these respects between the state
and national governments has become almost a by-word. Yet,
even as administrative units, the states would have duties to
perform, and they might be as inefficient in one capacity as
another.
(2) The corruption of state governments. There have
been scandals in connection with the general government, but
they have been unusual and no scandals to compare with those
connected with state administration in the bribery of officials,
the waste of public money, and the repudiation of public debts.
Of course there would be a possibility of some of this corruption
if the states were administrative units, but there would also be
the possibility of eliminating some of it.
(3) One of the greatest evils incident to a dual form of
government is the lack of uniformity of laws. With each state
a separate sovereignty, its legislature enacts and its supreme
court formulates laws differing from those of the other states,
although there is nothing in the local conditions of the state to
call for such action. The result is always hopeless confusion,
and often actual injustice. The people of one state are for the
most part no more interested in the laws of their own state, and
frequently are no more subject to them, than they are to the laws
of other states. As above pointed out, they are constantly moving
from one state to another. They do business in many states.
They have property in different states. They are all anxious to
know the law, in order to obey it and to receive its protection.
But they are not anxious to obey and receive the protection of
the laws of forty-eight states. In addition there are federal laws
and the country as a whole is constantly building up a general
common law. The statutes and decisions of all of the states and
of the federal government must be available in every first class
law library, and lawyers and courts have to try to familiarize
themselves with them. This is an impossible task. Neither at-
torneys nor their clients can ever master the great mass of law
in the United States. The situation in England should be com-
pared with this. There, there is not only no difficulty in knowing
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what law applies but in knowing all the law. The situation is
much as though we had in this country only the law of one state,
or of the federal government, and this would be the situation
if our dual form of government were abandoned. Attempts have
been made to accomplish a reform of this situation without the
abolition of the states as states. The Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State laws has for years been drafting and
recommending for adoption uniform acts. The American Law
Institute is now engaged upon the monumental task of restating
a United States common law. But nothing would facilitate
the reform like the abolition of the sovereignty of the states.
Good illustrations of injustice are found in the operation of our
inheritance tax laws, marriage and divorce la's, and law for-
bidding the sale of pistols.
(4) Incident to our dual form of government we have two
judicial systems, one state, the other federal. This is not a
necessary incident of a dual form of government, but we shall
probably never be able to get one judicial system so long as we
retain our dual form of government. Our courts need reorgan-
ization. Out state judges should be selected in a different man-
ner. Our legal procedure everywhere needs reformation. The
educational qualifications of many attorneys and judges are in-
adequate. But, so long as we retain two judicial systems in
this country all these reforms are practically impossible; and
we will retain our judicial systems so long as we retain our dual
form of government. With our dual form of government abol-
ished and one central government, it would follow inevitably
that we should have but one judicial system and all the other
legal reforms would easily follow. We should be free to adopt
and would adopt the modern English system of courts and legal
procedure. Then there would be no more branding of litigants
back and forth from one court to another. No more delay, tech-
nicality, and expense. But our courts and legal procedure would
become in fact real instruments for the administration of justice
on earth.
(5) The expense of government is another evil of the dual
form of government. The people are often governed twice. Two
governments, in many respects duplicate, are niaintained, where
for a great many matters (as in the administration of justice)
KENTUcKY LAw JouENAL
one government could do all the work better. The people have
to pay for this useless expense. It is not socially justifiable.
(6) A dual form of government encourages wrongdoers,
and functions badly. Criminals escape from one state to another,
and can be brought back for trial only by extradition. Laws like
a law forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons, enacted for
the protection of the people of one state, can be nullified by
simply crossing the state line. It is often impossible to tell when
commerce is interstate and when intrastate; when federal courts
have jurisdiction and when the states. Not only ordinary crim-
inals but public callings and other big corporate enterprises are
learning to take advantage of this situation.
(7) The dual form of government tends to develop fac-
tions. It has developed one secession.
(8) The dual form of government tends to embarrass us
in our foreign relations. Each of the states is a sovereign, and
it can behave in many respects like a sovereign to foreign
nations. Yet it cannot make treaties with foreign countries, and
when it is guilty of legal wrong to other countries the national
government is helpless to bring it to account.
24
(9) Perhaps one of the greatest arguments against the
dual form of govemnment is that it is in proces§ of disappearing
anyway, and it probably would be impossible to restore it. This
is not only the position of the Supreme Court; it is poiitical
sentiment of the land. Starting with the formation of the
Union, when the sentiment of the people was almost evenly di-
vided, the tide of United States political development has run
steadily in the direction of the increase of federal power and
responsibility. "Little by little the United States has changed
from a federation of territorial, individualistic democracies into
a highly organized social democracy which could not escape the
conscious assumption of a collective responsibility for the pop-
ular welfare. ' 25 Hence it would seem that it ought not to be
difficult for the people of the United States to reconcile them-
selves to a formal uhange in government.
24 One of the most recent illustrations of this has arisen in connec-
tion with the abandonment and divorce of French war brides, due to
the fact that the states control the subject of marriage and divorce.
. 12 New Republic, 211.
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(10) The last argument against a dual form of govern-
ment is that it is no longer adapted to conditions in the United
States. A centralized government is demanded. Past political
developments has only been in line with social necessity. The
original reasons for a dual form of government no longer exist.
Most good inherent in the original system has long since perished.
The evils largely remain. What we notice now are, expense, lack
of uniformity of laws, failure in the administration of justice-
embarrassment in our foreign relations.--all due to the fact of
a dual form of government. New reasons for a centralized gov-
ernment have arisen. Not only have the sentimental reasons for
a dual form of government changed, but business conditions have
changed. With the industrial revolution, business has ceased to
be individualistic and local and has become collective and na-
tional. Economic tendencies are bringing about a centralized
and specialized organization. Business is becoming interstate in
character. Not only are the operations of great business enter-
prises carried on in many states, or throughout the Union, but
ownership itself is becoming national in character. It is in the
hands of vast trusts and corporations, whose shareholders are not
citizens of any one state, but are scattered all over the United
States. No one of these shareholders has much control over his
own life, as a result of his ownership of stock, but the corpora-
tion has an immense influence over the lives of those not stock-
holders-employees and consumers. The federal system was
planned with reference to a different property and business sit-
uation. With the change in business should come a change in
the political situation. Centralization in business should be met
by centralization in government. In no other way will democ-
racy learn how to control business. But this spells the death of
our dual form of government.
Yet this should not be a cause for worry. When there is
conferred upon the federal government functions which the
states cannot, or cannot adequately perform, powers are not
taken away from the states so much as new powers are given to
the national government. Under a centralized government the
states, as administrative units, would still exercise all the func-
tions, or powers, which they should legitimately exercise. They
simply would lose some of the privileges and immunities, like
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that of sovereignty, and some of the powers, like that of the ad-
ministration of courts of justice, which they now possess, and
which there is no good reason for them to retain. The states
would no more be destroyed by the Nation than are cities by the
states, 'but there would be only one sovereignty in the United
States. It may be doubtful whether the finite earth is large
enough for more than one infinite, sovereign nation. Certainly
the United States is too small for forty-eight sovereign states in
addition to the federal government. With such a change, gov-
ernment in the United States would be placed on a plane higher
than it has even been before. We are now one country--one
people. Our government might, in very truth, become one gov-
government of one people, by one people, for one people.
HUGH EVANDER WDLIS.
University of Indiana.
